Aug
13
Article For The Iris Times
August 13, 2008 |
By Ambassador John Bruton
20th July 2005
The “pause for reflection” after the defeat of the European Union Constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands is an opportunity to ask some self-critical questions.
What, in essence, is the European Union (E.U.) for? Is it appropriate to the 21st Century needs of the Unions 450 million citizens? Do the needs of these 450 million citizens converge sufficiently for the E.U. to function effectively?
Does the Union, in its present extent, have sufficient shared identity to be able to demand sacrifices from its citizens when necessary? If the E.U. is to have an inherent outer boundary, should that boundary be set on the basis of physical geography, of shared history and identity, or simply on the basis of compliance with a set of abstract rules?
These existential questions were not really tackled in the Convention that drew up the E.U. Constitution. In practice the Convention accepted the existing powers and functions as a given. It set out to codify them, clarify the rights of E.U. citizens, and make some modest changes to enhance the Union’s capacity to do its’ existing job. The E.U. had already been given ambitious objectives and powers, in areas like crime, defence, foreign policy, economic policy and the environment in existing approved Treaties, and the Convention simply set out to make their exercise more effective.
All the existing E.U. treaties had a “constitutional” character in that they superceded national laws in their field of application. The E.U. Constitution did not change that. It did not reduce any country’s right to withdraw from the E.U. Nor did it confer on the Union any right to raise taxation, borrow money, or raise a defence force - the sort of things done by with the Constitutions of States. Unfortunately, by calling what was really a consolidating treaty a Constitution, we invited a debate in which certain E.U. principles, which had long been accepted as essential, were thrown into question.
For example, the debate in France during the recent referendum campaign about the right of “Polish plumbers” to work there suggested that some no longer accepted the most fundamental tenet of the European Union, going right back to its foundation, namely that people in the E.U. had a fundamental right to live and work in other E.U. countries. If that is to be called into question, and some have suggested it might be permanently set aside in the event of E.U. membership by Turkey, then the fundamental nature of the E.U. would be changed for the worse.
The E.U. can only work if certain basic principles are accepted, like the right of free movement and the willingness of member states to implement faithfully decisions of the European Court of Justice even when they go against the national interest.
There is another set of questions, which the Convention did attempt to answer.
Does the E.U. need more majoritarian democracy and, if so, what protection should there be for minorities and smaller member states? While no one could claim that the Union itself lacks legitimacy in that all its founding Treaties were individually approved by all member states, does it need some additional legitimation for its policies, so people feel that they have power to change those policies?
In response to these questions, the Constitution proposed to give more powers to the European Parliament and to introduce an enhanced system of consultation with national parliaments on E.U. legislation. It also proposed a system of petitions whereby a minimum number of E.U. citizens could require the Commission to prepare particular legislation.
Some argue that was not enough.
The European Parliament is indeed democratically elected and is a co-equal legislator with the Council of Ministers. But M.E.P.’s are not as accountable for the way they vote as members of the U.S. Congress or the Dáil. Many of the national systems to elect M.E.P.’s use party lists, where those near top of the list are guaranteed re-election.
Election campaigns for the European Parliament are fought not on the record of the outgoing European Parliament but on the basis of the popularity of parties in national politics. Indeed the Parliament was able to sack the Commission, an event that in a nation state would often lead to an immediate general election, without that even becoming a subject of controversy in the subsequent European Parliament election.
If we want legitimation of E.U. policies by the people, we need to devise a genuine “European” election, which is fought on E.U. issues only. That would give the people a sense that they could “throw the government out” at E.U. level, in the same way as they can at national level which is what legitimates national democracy. Even the proposal to elect a modest number of M.E.P.’s from an E.U. wide constituency did not get anywhere in the Convention. Nor did the more radical proposal that the President of the Commission be directly elected by all the people of Europe.
If the E.U. Constitution is to be amended for resubmission to the people of France and the Netherlands, more popular democracy on these lines would be useful. The rights of minorities and smaller states can be protected by retaining the present method of selecting all commissioners other than the President, and the qualification to majority voting in the Council that requires a majority to be almost 70%.
More E.U.-wide popular democracy would gradually create a greater sense of shared identity amongst E.U. citizens sufficient for them to be willing to accept sacrifices for the benefit of those living in other E.U. states. It would create popular ownership of the European Union.
It would not, however, answer all the fundamental questions posed at the beginning of this article. Let me try to answer those now.
What is the E.U. for?
The European Union is an instrument of policy, not a policy in itself. It is a tool rather than an objective. That tool may be used for new, and now unforeseeable, purposes in the future. We cannot, and should not attempt, to prescribe all those purposes in advance in any rigid document.
The E.U. is an instrument whereby the citizens of Europe can achieve things together that individual states are too small to achieve separately.
It is also a guarantee of good internal democratic governance and security of member states. This E.U. “seal of approval” is so valuable that countries are queuing up to sacrifice some sovereignty in order to join the E.U. The attractiveness of that E.U. “seal of approval” is one of the reasons why thirteen countries, dictatorships when I entered political life, are now democratic members of the E.U.
The needs of the 450 million E.U. citizens do converge sufficiently for the E.U. to function effectively. This is because all of them, even the richest, have a vital interest in maintaining that validity of that seal of approval and in keeping legally enforceable access to one of the largest markets in the world.
As to the boundaries of the Union, I do not think that these can be set in stone.
In practice, all the citizens of the present European Union do have some shared history and identity. Some of that shared history goes back two thousand years and some of it goes back to an E.U. meeting last week where some difficult problem was solved together by consensus. A shared history and identity is a growing and living thing. Its growth can be hastened, but only to a limited extent.
The European Union should leave the door of membership open, but explain that membership requires a deep lasting commitment to develop a common history and identity together. Assessing the depth of that commitment is a matter for practical political judgment in concrete circumstances, rather than for the mechanistic application of either abstract rules or artificial timetables.
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